Russia does not forcibly relocate its civilians into the occupied territories of Ukraine. Instead, it relies on an array of incentives, including preferential mortgages, employment programmes and tax benefits to increase the attractiveness of relocation. This gives rise to a question under the law of occupation: when does voluntary settlement of the Occupying Power’s civilian population amount to transfer prohibited by Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention?
Article 49(6) and the Prohibition
Article 49 (6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention prohibits the Occupying Power from transferring parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies to prevent an occupant from altering the demographic composition of occupied territory.
The scope of “transfer” has been addressed by the ICJ in several cases. In its 2004 Wall Advisory Opinion the Court examined Israel’s settlement policy in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT), where, as of 2004, around 200 settlements accommodated over 400,000 Israeli settlers. Although the movement of Israeli civilians into the OPT was voluntary, Israel offered financial incentives to encourage it, provided military protection to the settlements, and took security measures affecting the surrounding areas.
The Court found that the prohibition under Article 49(6) extended to “any measures taken by an occupying Power in order to organize or encourage transfers of parts of its own population into the occupied territory” and concluded that Israel’s settlement policy and practices were contrary to IHL.
Similarly, focus of the academic commentary was on the distinction between spontaneous voluntary migration and settlement encouraged by the Occupying Power. While voluntary movement of civilians does not necessarily fall under the prohibition, state involvement may change its character. In the Israeli context, scholars pointed to subsidies, tax benefits and preferential loan schemes as examples of measures the state used to encourage movement of population.
Twenty years later, the scale of Israeli settlements has significantly increased. By 2024, there were 700,000 Israeli settlers residing in the OPT, with Israel actively facilitating the expansion of settlements through construction support, while demolition and eviction orders against Palestinians further contributed to demographic changes.
In its 2024 Advisory Opinion, the ICJ further clarified the scope of Article 49(6). Drawing on evidence of Israeli incentives for the relocation of individuals and businesses, together with incentives for agricultural and industrial development, the Court found that both encouraging the settlers to relocate and maintenance of their presence constituted breaches of Article 49(6).
Accordingly, the voluntary nature of an individual’s decision to relocate does not in itself preclude the application of Article 49(6). The relevant inquiry is whether the Occupying Power encouraged the settlement of its civilian population in the occupied territory and made efforts to maintain it on the occupied territories. In the Ukrainian context, voluntary migration of Russian civilians may therefore fall within the prohibition where a sufficient connection can be established between such movement and measures adopted by the Russian authorities to promote settlement in temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine (hereinafter – TOT).
Russia’s Policies Facilitating Civilian Settlement in the TOT of Ukraine
Since the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the Russian Federation (hereinafter – Russia, the RF) has significantly expanded the use of state measures facilitating the settlement of Russian civilians in the TOT. These measures include access to housing, preferential conditions for economic activity, and long-term territorial planning.
The scale of the relocation process is already considerable: according to Ukraine’s Defence Intelligence, around 200,000 ethnic Russians were residing in the occupied parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions as of 2024, while another 200,000-300,000 were present in occupied Crimea as of July 2026.
Redistributing Homes of Ukrainians
Perhaps the clearest illustration of Russian policy is the appropriation and subsequent redistribution of residential property belonging to displaced Ukrainians. In December 2025, Russia adopted Federal Constitutional Law No. 4-FKZ, followed by legislation introduced by the occupation authorities regulating so-called “ownerless” property. Under these rules, residential property may be designated as ownerless on several grounds, including prolonged non-payment of utility bills, the absence of registration in Russia’s Unified State Register of Real Estate, or an alleged risk posed by the property to neighbouring residents.
In practice, the system creates significant obstacles for Ukrainians seeking to preserve their property rights, including requirements to appear in person before the occupation authorities for such registration and an informal requirement to hold a Russian passport.
The operation of this framework has already resulted in large-scale confiscation of residential property. According to the BBC, since 2024 the Russian occupation authorities have confiscated, or initiated procedures for the confiscation of, at least 34,002 properties belonging to Ukrainian citizens in the TOT. Federal Constitutional Law No. 4-FKZ provides for some of this housing to be transferred to Russian citizens permanently residing in the occupied regions, including residents of the Kursk and Belgorod regions who allegedly lost their homes as a result of hostilities. The same housing may also be allocated, under specialised tenancy arrangements, to Russian public officials, municipal employees, law enforcement personnel, and employees of state institutions, including schools and healthcare facilities.
This framework does more than regulate allegedly abandoned property. By making confiscated housing available to Russian citizens, it lowers one of the main barriers to permanent settlement in the occupied territories. It also raises a separate issue under the law of occupation, as Article 46 of the Hague Regulations protects private property from confiscation.
Making Housing Affordable for Russian Citizens
Alongside the redistribution of existing housing, Russia has introduced incentives encouraging Russian citizens to acquire residential property in the TOT. One of the most notable measures is the preferential mortgage programme introduced in 2023 for the purchase of residential property in the occupied parts of the Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions. The programme is scheduled to remain in force until 2030, offering mortgage loans at an interest rate of 2%, substantially below the average market rate in Russia and other preferential mortgage schemes available within the RF.
With relatively few eligibility restrictions, the programme is accessible to a broad range of Russian citizens. Combined with a 2% interest rate, it substantially reduces the cost of purchasing housing in the occupied territories, thereby creating a significant financial incentive to relocate. According to statements made during a plenary session of the Federation Council, more than 6,000 mortgages had already been issued under the programme by late 2025, with continued growth in its use being reported.
Creating Economic Incentives to Establish a Presence
A further mechanism operates through preferential conditions for economic activity. Russia has established a special economic zone (SEZ) in the TOT of Ukraine through Federal Law No. 266-FZ of 24 June 2023, designed to encourage businesses to establish and expand their operations there through a package of tax and investment incentives.
To qualify as a participant in the SEZ, a company or individual entrepreneur must, inter alia, be registered in one of the occupied territories (or establish a branch there) and undertake a minimum level of capital investment during the first three years of participation. Eligible participants benefit from a range of preferential measures, including reduced income tax rates (ranging from 0% to 13.5%, compared with the standard rate of 20%), a ten-year exemption from property tax, and reduced land tax for an initial three-year period.
Although these incentives are directed at businesses, they have effect on individual settlement decisions as well. Companies establishing operations in the occupied territories bring managers, employees and entrepreneurs with them, thus expanding Russia’s civilian presence on the ground.
Planning for Long-Term Population Growth
Finally, Russia makes no effort to conceal its objective of increasing the permanent Russian population of the TOT. This objective is expressly incorporated into its long-term territorial planning: official territorial planning documents project an additional 113,800 residents by 2045. These projections are particularly significant, as they provide direct evidence that population growth is not merely a consequence of Russia’s housing, employment or economic policies, but an anticipated outcome of its long-term planning for the TOT of Ukraine.
From Incentives to “Transfer”
The relevant question is not whether Russia forcibly relocates civilians into the occupied territories, but whether its policies amount to encouraging such movement within the meaning of Article 49(6).
Several features suggest that they do.
First, the measures are adopted or financed by the Russian state and are explicitly linked to the occupied territories. Some, such as the special economic zone and preferential mortgage regime, were designed specifically for these territories; others extend existing Russian programmes but provide substantially more favourable terms there. This territorial differentiation is particularly significant: a Russian citizen may obtain a 2% mortgage or substantially enhanced relocation payments precisely because they acquire housing or take up employment in the occupied territory of Ukraine.
Second, the incentives are substantial rather than incidental. Preferential access to housing, reduced borrowing costs, enhanced relocation payments and tax advantages lower the financial and practical barriers to relocation. At the same time, these measures are directed towards permanent rather than temporary residence: they encourage people to buy homes, establish businesses, invest capital and build long-term careers, making continued residence both economically attractive and practically sustainable.
Finally, the measures should not be assessed in isolation. Taken individually, each could be characterised as an ordinary housing, labour or economic policy. Taken together, they form a coherent framework addressing the principal conditions necessary for permanent settlement. Russia’s own territorial planning documents reinforce this conclusion by treating future population growth in the occupied territories as a policy objective. While the specifics of the Russian and Israeli settlement policies may differ, both illustrate how the Occupying Power does not merely accommodate voluntary migration, but actively creates conditions that encourage and sustain civilians in occupied territory.
Against this background, Russia’s conduct appears to fall on the side of active encouragement rather than mere accommodation of voluntary migration. It reflects a deliberate policy of encouraging the establishment of its civilian population in occupied Ukrainian territory. There are strong grounds to conclude that the measures discussed above fall within the prohibition of transfer of the Occupying Power’s civilian population within the meaning of Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention.
